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French National Assembly formally recognised 
the term war by law and authorised the use of the 
appellation La Guerre d’Algérie in French schools 
and in official terminology.2
In 2015, sixty years after the institution of the 
state of emergency, the same extraordinary law 
is enforced, but it took the French president a few 
hours to call the Paris attacks ‘an act of war’, and 
a few days after that to proclaim that ‘France is at 
war’. Hollande and his government, however, had 
no intention of recalling the peculiar character of 
warfare that France waged (and is still waging), a 
war that Colonel Roger Trinquier, a French army 
officer and theorist who served in Algeria, termed la 
guerre moderne (modern warfare).
The aim of this article is to trace the genealogy 
of the practices and theories of French modern 
warfare, its modus operandi, and its exportation to 
other parts of the world. The paper does not pretend 
to scrutinise the spatial organisation and built forms 
that resulted from this type of warfare, but rather to 
uncover the psychology and bureaucracy of mili-
tarily designed and controlled spaces.
Pacification is not peacemaking
On 3 April 1955, the French National Assembly and 
the Council of the French Republic approved law 
no. 55–385 on the state of emergency. Although 
the bill was modelled on the état de siège (state of 
siege) – that is, a state of war – the state of emer-
gency was not legally deemed a state of war in the 
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On the night of Friday, 13 November 2015, as the 
Paris attacks were still unfolding, François Hollande, 
President of the Fifth Republic stood before national 
television and declared the closing of the country’s 
borders and a nationwide état d’urgence (state of 
emergency). The French media compared these 
attacks with the calamities of World War II, thus 
disregarding and undermining the Paris Massacre 
of 17 October 1961, during La Guerre d’Algérie (the 
Algerian War, 1954–1962), which killed hundreds 
of peaceful Algerian pro-independence protesters 
who had gathered in Paris. The Paris police forces 
were then under the authority of Maurice Papon, a 
French civil servant who had served twice in Algeria 
under French colonial rule, and who was convicted 
of crimes against humanity in 1998 for his partici-
pation in the deportation of Jews in Bordeaux to 
concentration camps during World War II.1
The French newspaper Libération of Saturday 
and Sunday, 14–15 November, wrote that the 
exceptional law of the state of emergency was 
rooted in the Evènements d’Algérie (Algeria’s 
events), as it had been decreed for the first time 
on 3 April 1955, five months after the outbreak of 
the Algerian Revolution on 1 November 1954. 
The expression Evènements d’Algérie, as well as 
Opérations de maintien de l’ordre (the enforcement 
of law and order), were employed by the French 
authorities during and after the war to designate 
the Algerian War. It was not until 18 October 1999, 
under the presidency of Jacques Chirac, that the 
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and military officers; the application of significantly 
in-depth political and administrative actions; and 
the destruction, the capture, or the prevention of 
so-called rebels from threatening law and order. The 
military directive articulated the peculiar character-
istics of pacification by means of three operations, 
which involved: 
1. Action humaine: human action performed upon 
civilian populations, by becoming acquainted with 
them, supervising them, gaining their confidence, 
and obtaining their profound and unconditional 
support; 
2. Action constructive: constructive action that may 
comprise the construction of new connecting roads 
and infrastructures, the building of new administra-
tive centres and military posts, and the improvement 
of living conditions in the Aurès; and
3. Actions de protection: action of protection that were 
meant to create a permanent environment of insecu-
rity for the rebels by (a) intelligence, human contact, 
and ambushes; (b) the presence and action of mili-
tary forces, and police controls based on intelligence 
and political actions; (c) the progressive arming of the 
population in order to manage its own self-defence; 
(d) the éloignement (distancing) of ‘suspects’; and 
finally (e) conventional armed fighting against the 
rebels.7 
Whereas the term rebels alluded to Algerian revolu-
tionaries, the fighters for the liberation of a colonised 
population and territory, the word suspects entailed 
(as deliberately defined in the military directive) 
those ‘who provide any personal, volunteer and 
effective assistances to the rebels’.8 To this end, if 
any person – a family member, neighbour, friend, 
colleague, or anyone else – dared to feed, treat, 
dress, lodge, hide, or perhaps even speak to a 
revolutionary, he or she would systematically be 
considered a potential suspect and would imme-
diately be ‘distanced’ from the general population. 
eyes of the French authorities, because Algeria was 
considered a French territory; ironically, a state of 
war thus would have meant a civil war.3 The law 
gave exceptional powers to the then minister of the 
interior, François Mitterrand; to the French Prefects; 
and, in Algeria (under French colonial rule), to the 
then governor general of the French government 
in Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, a French ethnolo-
gist and former intelligence / anti-Vichy propaganda 
agent. 
The exceptional law of the undeclared war 
empowered the French authorities to confiscate 
legally owned weapons; control the press and 
censor publications, radio broadcasts, cinemato-
graphic screenings, and theatre performances; close 
gathering places; pronounce house confinements 
without judiciary oversight; forbid the circulation of 
vehicles, people, and gatherings in given areas and 
times; institute zones of protection or security where 
the ‘sojourning’ of people was regulated; and forbid 
the sojourning of any person who sought to hinder 
public authorities’ actions in any way.4 Given the 
(at the time) recent precedents of the Vichy regime 
and World War II, the law forbade the establishment 
of camps, stating that ‘under no circumstances 
[… may] the home arrest […] result in the creation of 
camps in which the persons referred to in the prec-
edent paragraph would be under detention’.5
In the Aurès Mountains, one of the most revolu-
tion-affected regions in north-eastern Algeria, the 
state of emergency was immediately enforced on 
6 April 1955. Six days later, the military cabinet of 
the governor general in Algeria circulated a memo 
bearing the title La pacification de l’Aurès (Aurès 
Pacification). It claimed that ‘the recovery of the 
situation in the areas where the state of emergency 
is enforced will be achieved by means of the policy 
of pacification’.6 Pacification in this sense consisted 
of systematic practices of profoundly dissimilar, yet 
interconnected, character that included the organi-
sation of an extensive network of administrators 
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and its replacement by a different order, whereas 
insurrection suggested merely a temporary uprising 
against an authority that will not necessarily result in 
the conquest of power. While the term counterinsur-
gency thus suggests non-permanent politico-military 
actions that are designed and executed against the 
activities of insurgents, this is, as we know, hardly 
the case.
Pacification is not peacemaking. In his Grammaire 
Africaine (African Grammar) in his 1957 book 
Mythologies, Roland Barthes claimed that during 
the armed conflict in Algeria, the French authori-
ties employed a language whose aim was not to 
communicate but rather to intimidate. This écriture 
cosmétique (cosmetic writing), as he argued, was 
ideologically burdened and politically loaded: a 
mask intended to divert the nature of the war and 
to cover the real facts with a ‘noise’ of language. 
Barthes wrote: 
War – the aim is to deny the thing. For there are two 
ways: either to name it as little as possible (the most 
common method); or to give it the meanings of its 
own antonym ([the] more devious method, which is 
the basis for almost all the mystifications of bourgeois 
language). War is then used in the sense of peace and 
pacification in the sense of war.12
The French doctrine of modern warfare
Among the leading practitioners and theorists of 
modern warfare who gained their practical experi-
ence in World War II, Indochina, and then in Algeria 
(some were also celebrated for the bloody Battle 
of Algiers) were colonels Marcel Bigeard, David 
Galula, Charles Lacheroy, and Roger Trinquier; 
and generals Paul Aussaresses, Jacques Massu, 
and Raoul Salan, who was then France’s most 
decorated soldier. He also founded (in January 
1961) a far-right extremist paramilitary group, 
the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS, or Secret 
Armed Organisation), which violently opposed the 
independence of Algerians and of Algeria. In 2003, 
The same guidelines stated that during the process 
of the éloignement of suspects, ‘no collective sanc-
tions of deportation character [will be] accepted. 
Construction sites [are] to be specified as soon as 
possible.’9 Because there were no written instruc-
tions that dictated how to distinguish ‘suspects’ from 
‘non-suspects,’ however, the entire Algerian popu-
lation thus became potentially suspect: enemies 
who should be converted into non-suspects, or, if 
possible, friends.
Despite the use of the epithet pacification by the 
French military and civil authorities in the nineteenth 
century (in the contexts of the colonial wars and the 
colonisation of Africa and south-eastern Asia), the 
policies, processes, methods, and technologies 
of pacification had been considerably upgraded 
to meet the conditions of the twentieth century: 
specifically, since the end of World War II and the 
beginning of the long Cold War. In his 1961 book La 
Guerre Moderne, Roger Trinquier – who had served 
in World War II, the Indochina War (1946–1954), 
and the Algerian War – defined modern warfare 
as ‘an interlocking system of actions – political, 
economic, psychological, military’.10 Trinquier unre-
servedly argued that ‘the sine qua non of victory 
in modern warfare is the unconditional support of 
a population. According to Mao Tse-tung, it is as 
essential to the combatant as water to the fish.’11 
To this end, the Algerian War marked a shift from 
conventional to unconventional warfare; from the 
clash of two armies in a given battlefield to a much 
more complex system of operations, in which the 
target is hardly discernible, and therefore the entire 
population is at risk. 
Modern warfare was also frequently referred to as 
asymmetric, irregular, subversive, psychological, or 
revolutionary warfare. Its counterpart term, counter-
revolutionary warfare, was immediately substituted 
with the term counterinsurgency operations, most 
likely because the term revolution entailed a forcible 
overthrow of an established authority in a country 
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In the same line of thought, Colonel Trinquier, who 
recommended and defended the use of torture, 
claimed that the population may be forced to support 
the French anti-independence struggle, highlighting 
that ‘such support may be spontaneous, although 
that is quite rare and probably a temporary condi-
tion. If it doesn’t exist, it must be secured by every 
possible means, the most effective of which is 
terrorism.’15 
Colonel Galula, meanwhile, noted that ‘paci-
fication would be achieved if we could gradually 
compromise the population in the eyes of the 
rebels’.16 Galula is well known to English-speaking 
military strategists and readers, since he published 
two manuals in English when he was a research 
associate at Harvard University’s Center for 
International Affairs between 1962 and 1967: 
Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958 (in 1963) and 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(in 1964).
Colonel Galula’s 1964 monograph on the theory 
and practice of counterrevolutionary warfare influ-
enced the Department of the US Army, even in 
the writing of its 2006 field manual FM 3–24, enti-
tled Counterinsurgency, which was addressed to 
US soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. As 
noted in its foreword, the manual was meant to fill 
a doctrinal gap of twenty years.17 Colonel Galula’s 
thinking was frequently cited in the manual’s second 
chapter, ‘Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and 
Military Activities’, notably when he argued that in 
this type of war, ‘the soldier must be then prepared 
to become […] a social worker, a civil engineer, a 
schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for 
as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better 
to entrust civilians’ tasks to civilians.’18 Colonel 
Galula’s claim of the extra-military responsibilities of 
army officers was informed by the French school of 
colonial warfare that recognised the so-called social 
role of army officers. The school was developed by 
Marshal Thomas Robert Bugeaud in French colonial 
the year of the invasion of Iraq and the capture of 
the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, by US forces, Marie-
Monique Robin, a French journalist, released a film 
documentary titled Escadrons de la mort: l’école 
française (Death Squads: The French School), in 
which she told of the export of the French military 
doctrine imposed by the French army on Algerians 
(including the systemic use of torture) to North 
and South America, notably to Argentina, Chile, 
and the United States.13 Robin interviewed French 
officers who were still alive and who were willing 
to confirm the doctrine they had set up, and their 
role in disseminating their war strategies and tactics 
during and after Algeria’s independence. To under-
stand the French doctrine of the death squads, it 
is relevant to analyse some of the discourses and 
practices that France enforced in Algeria in order 
to keep Algeria under French colonial rule and to 
exploit the Algerian Saharan region. 
On 2 July 1957, Colonel Lacheroy, then Chief of 
the Service of Psychological Action and Intelligence 
at the French Ministry of National Defense, and who 
later served in the Algerian cities of Constantine 
and Algiers, delivered a lecture to an audience 
of two thousand officers at the auditorium of the 
Sorbonne in Paris entitled La guerre révolutionnaire 
et l’arme psychologique (Revolutionary Warfare 
and Psychological Weaponry). He drew particular 
attention to the radically distinct character of this 
form of warfare, which consisted of total warfare. 
He claimed: 
total, because not only [does it mobilise] in this effort 
all industrial, commercial, [and] agricultural powers of 
a country, but also it takes and pushes in the effort 
of war all children, all women, all elderly men, all that 
thinks, all that lives, all that breathes, with all their 
forces of love, all their forces of enthusiasm, all their 
forces of hate, and it throws them into war. This is the 
new factor. Total war because it takes the souls as well 
as the bodies and it yields them to the obedience of 
the effort of war.14 
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military authorities, whom he termed the ‘counterin-
surgents’, as follows: 
the ideal situation for the insurgent would be a large 
landlocked country shaped like a blunt-tipped star, 
with jungle-covered mountains along the borders 
and scattered swamps in the plains, in a temperate 
zone with a large and dispersed rural population and 
a primitive economy. [Fig. 1] The counterinsurgent 
would prefer a small island shaped like a pointed star, 
on which a cluster of evenly spaced towns are sepa-
rated by desert, in a tropical or arctic climate, with an 
industrial economy.23 [Fig. 2]
With the latter figure in mind, the French authorities 
remodelled the entire Algerian territory, causing a 
massive forced resettlement of roughly three million 
people that they named the regroupement des 
populations (regrouping of populations); the subse-
quent built settlements were termed the centres 
de regroupements (regrouping centres). In reality, 
however, they looked like camps. 
Militarily controlled camps
In an attempt to legitimise the reorganisation of 
the Algerian territory and the massive resettle-
ment of the Algerian rural populations, the French 
governors general in Algeria – Soustelle and his 
successor, the socialist Robert Lacoste – claimed 
that Algeria was dangerously underadministered, 
and that its population was too large to maintain 
the 1848 territorial departmentalisation. According 
to Lacoste, a new territorial reorganisation ought to 
face several of the population’s most urgent admin-
istrative necessities.24 He drew particular attention 
to the departments of the Hauts Plateaux (where the 
Aurès Mountains are located), in which, according 
to him, minor rural populations occupied overly vast, 
underdeveloped areas. As a result of a planned 
enhancement of Algeria, new regions, departments, 
districts, and municipalities were created between 
1955 and 1958, coupled with a strategic choice of 
new administrative epicentres in order to ensure a 
Algeria, refined by Marshal Joseph Simon Gallieni 
in French colonial Indochina, and then dissemi-
nated by Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey 
in the French Protectorate of Morocco.19 In his first 
influential article, Du rôle social de l’officier dans 
le service miliaire universel (On the Social Role of 
the Officer in the Universal Military Service), from 
1891, Marshal Lyautey criticised the rigidity and 
inadequacy of the French military education. He 
demanded that it provide ‘a fruitful conception of the 
modern role of the officer to become the educator 
of the entire nation’.20 Furthermore, he argued that 
it was necessary to transform the cruel sides of the 
war into a good opportunity, and thereby to ‘display, 
during the course of the military service, not only 
the violent and sterile fatigue, but also the broader 
field of the social action’.21 Both warfare doctrines 
employed the term pacification in order to imply war, 
both applied the military strategy of winning hearts 
and minds, and both employed soldiers to serve 
as ‘nation builders as well as warriors’:22 that is, to 
meet both civil-political and military objectives. 
Over the course of the French War in Algeria, 
such aims coincided with specific territorial and 
spatial operations. Officers drew new borders, built 
new infrastructures, forcibly displaced Algerian 
civilians, and erected new shelters: not to colonise 
Algeria (because Algeria was already considered 
a French department), but to oversee and monitor 
every movement and activity of the colonised popu-
lations who were deemed to be potential suspects. 
Given that 1) the entire population (then about 
ten million) was affected, that 2) the Algerian terri-
tory was enormous (about four times larger than 
France), and that 3) the rural population was spread 
over its large countryside, the French authorities 
forced entire populations to adhere to new maps 
that dictated a new distribution of the whole rural 
population and a portion of the urban population. 
Colonel Galula described the exemplary geographic 
situations for Algerian liberation fighters, whom he 
called the ‘insurgents’, and for the French civil and 
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evacuate the forbidden zones, thus forcing civilians 
to leave their homes, villages, and arable lands. 
This military operation not only damaged countless 
Algerian villages and uprooted numerous Algerian 
peasants, but it also engendered the establishment 
of thousands of centres de regroupement.29 
The French term centre de regroupement poses 
translation problems, because it involves both a 
displacement and a concentration of civilians – the 
extrajudicial detention enabled by the state of emer-
gency – into an enclosed and surveyed space; it 
also entails precisely that which it is not. For obvious 
reasons, the words concentration and camp were 
circumvented in official military parlance, and, 
consequently, by the majority of the French media. 
In 1957, Maurice Papon, at the time the Inspector 
General of Administration in the Extraordinary [civil-
military] Mission in Eastern Algeria and Prefect of the 
Department of Constantine, rigorously requested 
the immediate suppression of the term camp 
from all road signs and indications in the Algerian 
Department under his authority, stating: ‘the term 
camp will have to disappear from the terminology’.30 
The term regroupement, on the other hand, 
seems to inhabit a purely military sense, in that 
it coincides with the meaning of concentration. 
According to one French dictionary, regroupe-
ment is the action of regrouping, which means, ‘1. 
To group, to unite anew (what was dispersed): To 
regroup officers of an army. 2. To group (dispersed 
elements), together. à to reassemble: To regroup 
the populations.’31 Concentration, meanwhile, is the 
action of concentrating, which means (according to 
the same dictionary) ‘to gather in a centre. Military: 
The concentration of troops in an area of the terri-
tory. à Grouping, roundup, regrouping. Special: 
Camps de Concentration.’32
Whereas the state of emergency empowered 
the Fourth Republic to acquire a lawful form that 
allowed for regulating the residence and circulation 
pressing national security regime and to facilitate 
the regional communication and enforcement of 
French regulations.25 At the military level, however, 
the entire territory was gradually interpenetrated by 
adjustable infrastructures and hermetic cobwebs 
of checkpoints, watchtowers, military posts, border 
fortifications, minefields, and electric fences, all of 
which enabled continual counterrevolutionary mili-
tary operations.26 
The French army progressively allocated 
particular areas of the Algerian territory to one of the 
three main military categories: zones opérationnelles 
(zones of operation), zones de pacification (pacifi-
cation zones), and the zones interdites (forbidden 
zones).27 In the zones of operation, officers were 
ordered to utilise any means possible to restore 
security. In the militarily controlled zones of pacifica-
tion, the army employed the action psychologique 
(psychological action) against civilians, who were 
forcefully administered, supervised, and indoctri-
nated, as well as being induced to collaborate with 
the army.28 Finally, there were the forbidden zones, 
which consisted of free-fire zones for both air and 
ground military forces; these zones needed to be 
cleared of any living beings, including animals. The 
prohibited regions were frequently isolated places, 
and they often comprised vast woodlands and high-
lands, but they also included inhabited rural areas, 
from which large masses of civilians were forcefully 
relocated to ensure safe zones for the French army. 
The various territorial categories spawned 
frequent spatial misunderstandings and border 
conflicts between the civilian and military authori-
ties. The civilian administrative subdivisions, for 
their part, consisted of departments, districts, and 
municipalities, while the systematic military quadril-
lage (gridding) was composed of zones, sectors, 
subsectors, quartiers, and sub-quartiers, which 
were intended to be combined with one of the oper-
ational, pacification, or forbidden military zones. 
The most unmistakable directive, however, was to 
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Fig. 1: Ideal territory for the insurgent © Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 28.




the forbidden zones, and therefore the number of 
camps continued to increase throughout the course 
of the Algerian War of Independence. 
The Inspection Générale des Regroupements 
de Population (IGRP, or General Inspection of the 
Regroupings of the Population), a French mili-
tary institution that was mandated to inspect the 
regrouping of the Algerian population that had been 
accomplished by military officers, argued that ‘the 
creation of the regroupement is the most effective 
means for subtracting the population from the influ-
ence of the rebels’.37 It went on to claim that ‘the 
policy of the regroupement is one [of] the master-
pieces of the manoeuvre of pacification’.38
The architects of the camps 
Central to the construction of the camps de regroupe-
ment were the extraordinary army units called the 
Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS, or 
Specialised Administrative Sections). The SAS 
were deployed in September 1955 in rural areas 
in order to assume the powers that were usually 
offered, as per Decree no. 55–1274, to ‘adminis-
trators of civil services on the individual decision 
of the Governor General of Algeria’.39 The military 
missions of the SAS officers entailed the gathering 
of intelligence, the diffusion of propagandistic infor-
mation, the ensuring of law and order, and the direct 
control of the civilian population, while their civil 
functions consisted of providing social, economic, 
educational, sanitary, and medical facilities, as well 
as to evacuate the populations and monitor the 
construction of militarily controlled camps with tech-
nical knowledge that was almost nonexistent. 
Similar divisions were subsequently imple-
mented in urban areas in order to cope with the 
alarming numbers of the bidonvilles (slums, literally 
‘can-towns’), in addition to performing most of the 
aforementioned civil-military responsibilities; these 
were then named the Sections Administratives 
of civilians and controlling their activities, as well as 
arresting persons at any time and at any place, the 
creation and construction of camps was unquestion-
ably banned, as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, 
camps were intensively and continuously created. 
One estimate for 1960 evaluated 2,157,000 forcibly 
resettled persons; another evaluation (for 1961) 
considered that at least 2,350,000 persons had 
been concentrated into camps, and that an addi-
tional 1,175,000 persons were compelled to leave 
their original homes due to constant and violent 
military operations.33 That is to say, 3,525,000 
persons were compulsorily displaced in Algeria 
under French colonial rule.34 Another figure, for 15 
February 1962 – just a few weeks before Algeria’s 
independence – reported that 3,740 camps de 
regroupement had been built in French Algeria since 
the outbreak of the revolution in 1954.35 Even today, 
historians – both Algerian and French, civil and mili-
tary – have yet to agree on the exact numbers of the 
resettled populations, the devastated villages, and 
the camps that were built.
Despite the fact that these camps had been 
created since the outset of the Algerian Revolution, 
it was not until 1957, under the military command 
of General Raoul Salan, that official military poli-
cies stamped ‘secret’, ‘secret–confidential’, or 
‘top-secret’ began to regulate the creation of the 
forbidden zones, as well as of the forced resettle-
ment of civilians. Notable among these endeavours 
was the construction and completion of the defen-
sive perimeter called the Morice Line that sealed off 
Algeria’s eastern and western borders with Tunisia, 
Libya, and Morocco in order to prevent human 
circulation and material exchanges.36 The Morice 
Line provoked a rapid and massive expansion of 
the camps. Furthermore, the military Challe Plan 
fortified the Morice Line in 1958 with additional elec-
trified wire, minefields, barriers, and checkpoints. 
These systematic counterrevolutionary operations 
intensified the imposed evacuation of civilians from 
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literature on the SAS. It was intended to divulge 
French experiences in colonial Algeria during the 
Algerian War, and in particular to provide a guide 
for the stabilisation of local populations who had 
been claimed and enforced by French troops who 
were ‘in charge of similar assignments in Bosnia, 
Afghanistan and soon in Kosovo’.42 As asserted in 
these military guidelines, the SAS were the direct 
heirs of the nineteenth-century Bureaux Arabes 
(Arab Bureaus) in colonial Algeria, of the twentieth-
century Affaires Indigènes (Indigenous Affairs) in 
Morocco, and of the greatest French colonial mili-
tary officers, notably Bugeaud and Lyautey. The 
manual made no mention of the camps, however, 
nor of the special roles played by SAS officers in 
the politico-military policy of mass resettlement of 
the civilian population. Instead, it dedicated less 
than a page to the villages de regroupement, which 
it said were part of the socio-economic activities of 
the SAS within the Plan de Constantine launched 
by General de Gaulle in October 1958.43 Contrary to 
this assessment, French military archival documents 
demonstrate that SAS officers were responsible 
not only for evacuating existing villages for military 
reasons, but also for supervising the construction of 
the camps.
One such piece of evidence may be found in the 
various factsheets about the centres de regroupe-
ments that were drafted in August 1958 by the SAS 
chiefs of the Department of Bône (today Annaba, 
Algeria) in response to the telegram of the General 
Commander of the Zone of Eastern Constantine 
(ZEC) asking for accurate quantitative data about 
the camps. The majority of these archival records 
contained the camps’ names, dates of creation, and 
geographic locations; their populations; the condi-
tions of their shelters; their hygienic circumstances; 
their medical services; their existing schooling facili-
ties; their means of subsistence; their possibilities 
of employment of the labour force; their clothing 
and food requirements, such as oil, condensed 
Urbaines (SAUs, or urban administrative sections). 
By the end of 1961, twenty SAUs coexisted in urban 
neighbourhoods inhabited by the Algerian popula-
tion (including the Casbah of Algiers), and there 
were more than seven hundred SASs in the vast 
areas of Algeria’s countryside and the immense 
Sahara.40
In an attempt to supervise the majority of the 
population, every SAS extended its various opera-
tions over a maximum of ten to fifteen thousand 
persons, which was thought to correspond to the 
population of two to three Algerian villages. The 
chiefs of the SASs were expected to be able to 
speak the local language of the geographic areas 
in which they were appointed (either Arabic or one 
of the Berber languages), or were quickly trained 
to speak the language if they did not. In most of 
the SASs, the team members included one to three 
subofficers, a secretary, an interpreter, a radio oper-
ator, often an auxiliary medical officer, and one or 
two nurses. Each SAS possessed its own security 
forces, called Makhzen, which comprised from thirty 
to fifty Algerian men who were in one way or another 
compelled to serve in the French army.41 In order to 
gain an intimate knowledge about Algerians, SAS 
officers received special training in administrative, 
legislative, geographic, economic, health, agricul-
tural, religious, traditional, historical, gender, and 
sociological features of the Algerian Arabic and 
Berber populations. 
In October 2005, fifty years after the establishment 
of the SAS, the military Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi 
des Forces (CDEF, or Doctrine Centre for Forces’ 
Employment) under the French Ministry of Defense 
released a ponderous study called Les Sections 
Administratives Spécialisées en Algérie: Un outil 
pour la stabilisation (Specialised Administrative 
Sections in Algeria: An Instrument for Stabilisation). 
The military survey was based on a number of 
interviews with former SAS officers and selected 
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into the vicissitudes of a handful of SASs in just one 
department, a tiny part of the regroupement of Barral 
presented an exceptional situation: 145 families 
(out of two thousand people) were lodged in dwell-
ings that were purpose-built by the Commissariat 
à la Reconstruction et à l’Habitat Rural (CRHR, or 
Rural Housing and Reconstruction Commission), 
which had been established in the aftermath of the 
devastating earthquake of 9 September 1954 in the 
Algerian town of Orléansville (today Chlef).49
A typical plan from 1956 of the habitat rural 
(rural housing) in the camp designed by the CRHR 
consisted of a one-floor unit composed of two 
identical spaces; one served for indoors activities 
and the other (a courtyard) for outdoors pursuits, 
so essential to the daily lives of Algerian families. 
The dimensions of the courtyard were six by just 
less than five metres, resulting in an area of about 
twenty-nine square metres. The indoor entity was 
composed of a main room of less than fourteen 
square metres (4.9 by 2.9 metres); a smaller room, 
of around seven square metres (3 by 2.3 metres); 
a tiny kitchen; and a minuscule WC. The kitchen (2 
by 1.7 metres) comprised cooking equipment and 
a small washbasin, whereas the space for sanita-
tion facilities included no sink, but merely a WC that 
was also to be used as a shower. While the housing 
unit was juxtaposed with another identical one, the 
latter was shifted in such a way that the courtyard of 
the former was always surrounded by three indoor 
spaces, which was not always taken into considera-
tion; therefore, the privacy of the dislocated families 
was again further invaded. This overall configu-
ration could result in an infinite row of housing 
units, and its multiple iterations could compose 
what the CRHR have called the cité d’habitat rural 
(rural housing settlements), and some SAS simply 
as the cité rurale (rural settlement). Despite the 
considerable differences in climatic and socio-
economic conditions, such dwellings, destined for 
rural displaced populations, were analogously built 
across the entire territory of Algeria.
milk, sugar, and coffee; and their monthly needs 
of semolina, wheat, and barley.44 The figures of 
the evacuated populations, as well as the effec-
tive conditions of the standing shelters varied from 
camp to camp and from SAS to SAS. 
For instance, in the SAS of Bordj-M’raou, 
which monitored the daily lives of 1,346 people 
in the camp of Bordj-M’raou, the majority of the 
huts were made of straw and had only one main 
opening; only five people (who were considered by 
the SAS to be ‘traders’) had been able to build a 
house of durable materials, with a thatched roof.45 
In the case of another SAS (of Gounod, in the 
arrondissement of Guelma), the housing and living 
conditions of the displaced civilian inhabitants of 
the ongoing regroupement were, according to its 
chief, very precarious. Most of the people were 
piled ‘into the ruins of damaged barracks or housed 
in tents – some families have been resettled in 
“improved huts” whose construction was carried on 
as long as the municipality provided the credits.’46
In another larger camp called Herbillon, which held 
three thousand people, families were distributed in 
either huts or tents. Fifty families were about to be 
transferred to one of the fifty newly built dwellings 
named cités d’habitat rural (rural housing settle-
ments), and that an additional cité de regroupement 
of a hundred metal-framed housing units was initi-
ated so that within the next two months, a hundred 
families would again be relocated.47 In contrast to 
this reality, as specified in the survey about the 
camps in the municipality of Mondovi, during the 
previous two years, ‘many families [had been] 
invited to leave their habitual place of residence in 
the mountain[s;] nothing was planned or officially 
organised to receive them’.48 The survey described 
the disastrous hygienic conditions and the distress 
of certain families who were constrained to rent the 
floor of courtyards as living spaces, as in the case of 
132 people who were compelled to argue over 120 
square metres of space. And to complete this insight 
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Algerians from the Atlas Mountains Have Been 
Gathered in a Thousand Villages).50 [Figs. 3–5] The 
unique and apparently preconceived number – one 
million – announced by the French media was 
merely indicative. In fact, among the French army, 
the situation was rather different; as argued by the 
IGRP, it was clear that by ‘1959 we [had] found 
ourselves […] facing a very serious situation: it had 
become impossible to quantify even approximately 
the volume of the displaced rural populations since 
1954’.51
In the wake of the media scandal and criticism, 
Delouvrier proclaimed that he would personally 
take care of the regroupement of Algerian popula-
tions, and subordinate it to his direct control, and 
he announced a large rural renovation programme 
that he called the Mille villages (One Thousand 
Villages). The regrouping suddenly became 
grounded on rural modernisation reforms, and was 
thereby rapidly attached to General de Gaulle’s 
strategic politico-economic Plan de Constantine 
(1959–1963). In his communication to Delouvrier, 
de Gaulle wrote that ‘the will of the Government is 
that Algeria, through the ordeals and despite the 
delays, reveals gradually itself in its deep reality 
thanks to the action conducted by all France. To this 
end, you need to pacify and administer, but at the 
same time, transform.’52
Delouvrier ordered an immediate improvement 
of the subsistence and economic conditions of the 
camps. He established mobile teams, composed 
of a military officer and two skilled professionals of 
rural planning, which he called Equipes Itinérantes 
d’Aménagement Rural (Mobile Teams for Rural 
Planning).53 These teams were expected to study 
(a) the future of the regrouping; (b) the economic 
viability of the centres; (c) the legal status of occu-
pied lands; (d) the people’s administrative needs for 
education and health care; (e) the extent of imme-
diate assistance; and (f) the military concerns of 
security and self-defence.54
Transforming camps into ‘villages’
In April 1959, a year after the first ‘Generals’ Putsch’ 
in Algiers, the collapse of the Fourth Republic, and 
the return of General de Gaulle to power, and a few 
months after the adoption of the constitution of the 
Fifth Republic, a media scandal over the existence 
of the Algerian camps arose in France. The scandal 
was provoked by two Frenchmen who were allowed 
to visit the camps: Monsignor Jean Rodhain (1900–
1977), Secretary General of the Secours Catholique 
(Caritas France), who had just returned from a visit 
to colonial Algeria and had launched an emergency 
appeal for humanitarian aid there; and Michel 
Rocard (b. 1930), the young Inspector General of 
Finances, who leaked his report on the centres 
de regroupement, which he submitted in February 
1959 to the newly appointed general delegate of 
the French government in Algeria, Paul Delouvrier 
(1914–1995). 
Newspaper articles reported on the disgraceful 
conditions of the camps, and deplored the mate-
rial and psychological situations of the resettled 
Algerian families, which included a great number 
of children who suffered from diseases and famine. 
Their titles speak of the Algerians’ misery: ‘Dans les 
camps d’Algérie des milliers d’enfants meurent…’ 
(In Algerian Camps, Thousands of Children Die); 
‘Un million d’Algériens “regroupés” par l’armée 
menacés de famine’ (One Million Algerians 
‘Regrouped’ by the Army Threatened with Famine); 
‘Un million d’Algériens dans les camps: c’est la 
guerre’ (One Million Algerians in Camps: This is 
War); ‘Un million d’Algériens parqués dans des 
camps de “regroupement”’ (One Million Algerians 
Parked in ‘Regroupment’ Camps); ‘J’ai visité, près 
de Blida, les villages de regroupement’ (I Have 
Visited, near Blida, the Villages of Regroupment), 
‘Un million d’Algériens derrière les barbelés…’ (One 
Million Algerians Behind Barbed Wire); ‘Algérie: un 
million de personnes déplacés’ (Algeria: One Million 
People Displaced); ‘Un million d’Algériens de l’Atlas 
ont été rassemblés dans mille villages’ (One Million 
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Fig. 3: Newspaper clipping, L’humanité, 17 April 1959. FR SHAT 1 H 2485 © Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre.
Fig. 4: Newspaper clipping, Libération, 18 April 1959. FR SHAT 1 H 2485 © Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre.






Fig. 6: Camp de regroupement in Northern Constantine in 1959. ECPAD D104-127 © Etablissement de 
Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense.
Fig. 7: Regroupement in Thiers (Kadiria today) in the region of Kabylia in 1959. ECPAD ALG 59 378 R6 
© Etablissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense.
Fig. 8: Regroupement of Bazer in the region of Setif in 1958. ECPAD ALG 58-347 R17 © Etablissement de 
Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense.
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Fig. 9: Regroupement in Tizi-Ouzou. FR SHAT 1H 1119/1 © Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre.
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Fig. 10: Regroupement in Tiaret. FR SHAT 1H 1119/1 © Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre.
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Delouvrier’s appeal for the ‘betterment’ of the 
camps was not always upheld thanks to the weighty 
French bureaucratic machine, the long, drawn-
out freeing up of appropriate funds, and the lack 
of determination of a number of military and SAS 
officers. In his circular no. 3.852 CC of 5 May 1959, 
Delouvrier informed civil and military authorities 
that the general delegation of the government in 
Algeria had signed an agreement with the French 
Red Cross, and that three specially equipped lorries 
were formally authorised to circulate throughout the 
regroupements and to procure food and medical 
aid. The first Red Cross lorry departed only on 25 
June in the Region of Algiers, as announced by 
Delouvrier in his circular of 1 July 1959, in which 
he requested his men to engage in total collabo-
ration: ‘in these difficult circumstances that we are 
facing, and given the enormous needs created by 
the Centres de Regroupement, I believe that we 
must welcome and facilitate, insofar as possible, 
the offers of help that we are likely to receive’.58 To 
this end – and in addition to this humanitarian assis-
tance that undeniably displayed the inability of the 
French army to deal with the socio-economic prob-
lems that it had generated in the camps – Delouvrier 
promoted any sort of patronage, sponsorship, and 
twinning of the camps, including offers by a number 
of religious organisations. 
Whereas the centres de regroupement were 
often surrounded by barbed-wire fences and watch-
towers, from whence armed guards were ready to 
open fire, the mille villages were intended to look 
like planned rural settlements.59 Their locations 
were strategically selected, however, and a strict 
gridiron plan was frequently employed in order to 
enable military surveillance and to facilitate the 
enforcement of law and order. The ideal site for 
a grid plan was undoubtedly the plains, far away 
from the remote mountainous topography that 
was typical of the Aurès. A wide linear main street 
ran through the flat land of a typical settlement 
to permit immediate access. The central area of 
On 24 April 1959, Delouvrier circulated directive 
no. 3.444 CC, in which he recalled his guidelines 
that announced that if the regroupement were 
based on sane economic and property foundations, 
it might become a foyer de promotion sociale (a 
place of social promotion), but, as he highlighted, ‘if 
the inhabitants would not find, in the dictated places 
of settlement, opportunities for normal existence, 
the regroupement is the place of impoverishment 
and discontent in which the politico-administrative 
organisation of the adversary would find a fertile 
ground for agitation’.55 In order to circumvent rebel-
lion, Delouvrier endeavoured to turn existing camps 
into foyers de promotion sociale by enhancing the 
living conditions of the forcibly resettled populations 
and by providing prospects for ‘normal existence’, to 
paraphrase Delouvrier, although the circumstances 
of war were far from being ‘normal’. 
According to Delouvrier, ‘the sought objective is 
to render economically viable all regroupements, 
that is, to ensure every regrouped family the 
possibility to gain its means of subsistence from a 
productive job, which will mostly be farming’.56 This 
aim was to be applied in different cases and was to 
be achieved depending on the case; he described 
three plausible circumstances: two opposing situa-
tions, and one intermediate situation that he urged 
was to be considered the priority. The first consisted 
of regroupements that were located in territories 
without any access to arable land and pastures; 
he recommended submitting these cases to the 
general commanders of the zones in question, 
who would, in accordance with military obligations, 
displace (again) the populations into more advan-
tageous locations. The second probable situation 
consisted of the forced regrouped populations who 
now had access to their original farming land, and 
had been allowed to maintain their own domains of 
subsistence; as such, they did not require any urgent 
mediation. And finally, all those regroupements that 
belonged neither to the first case nor to the second 
necessitated an immediate intervention.57
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